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This case is about what rights the parties have under federal land patents
issued to their respective predecessors in interest. Appellant Nadine F. Gillmor's
("Gillmor") title stems from a grant by the United States of a homestead patent to
John Clark on December 20, 1930. Clark's application was filed in 1917 with the
regional land office located in Salt Lake City, Utah after Congress had passed
The Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916
(the "1916 Act"). John Clark's application was for a homestead patent under the
1916 Act on land upon which he had previously made entry.
REPLY TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Blue Ledge indicates that it disagrees with the statement of issues
presented by Gillmor in her opening brief. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24 (b)(1).
However, Blue Ledge has not filed an appeal. Thus, its recitation of its "issues
presented for review" in Gillmor's appeal is not helpful. The opening brief filed by
appellant, Gillmor, sets forth the issues presented for review and now before this
Court:
1) When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must
consider all undisputed material facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&K Management, Inc., 2003 UT 5, U 6. Did
the trial court err in how it applied the respective procedural burdens borne by the
parties? Brief of Appellant, p. 1 (Issue No. 1).

1

2) A title granted by the United States is entitled to a strong presumption in
favor of the validity. Did the trial court err in quieting title in appellee, determining
that no title passed to appellant's predecessor in interest, via patent, in 1930?
Brief of Appellant, p. 1 (Issue No 2.a).
3) A suit by the United States or its successors to annul or vacate any
patent must be brought within six years after the issuance of the patent. 43
U.S.C. § 1166. Did the trial court err when it ruled that appellant could not assert
that six-year statute of limitations to bar appellee's quiet title counterclaim? Brief
of Appellant, p. 2 (Issue No. 2.b).
4) Did the trial court err when, in spite of the parties' joint inaction, it
dismissed with prejudice appellant's claims and defenses based on adverse
possession for failure to prosecute them but did not also dismiss with prejudice
appellee's counterclaim? Brief of Appellant, p. 2 (Issue No. 3).
The first three (3) issues are reviewed for correctness. Brief of Appellant,
p. 1-2. "'[Correctness' means the appellate court decides the matter for itself
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994); see also Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d
1254, 1256 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The final issue is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, U 15, 46 P.3d 753,
756.
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REPLY TO BLUE LEDGE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Blue Ledge asserts that the facts related to Gillmor's adverse possession
claim are irrelevant to the issues on appeal. Brief of Appellee, p. 11-12.
However, the district court's dismissal with prejudice of Gillmor's adverse
possession claim is squarely before this Court, and indeed one of the issues on
appeal. Thus, facts related to Gillmor's adverse possession claim are clearly
crucial to this Court's analysis.
Blue Ledge alleges that both surface and mining estates were granted to
Clegg. Brief of Appellee, p. 12-13. As set forth more fully below, Gillmor disputes
that both the surface and mining estates were conveyed from the United States to
Clegg by patent dated May 22, 1929, R.367-374, 523-24, Transcript of Hearing of
November 7, 2005, R.627, at 14:18-16:12, 16:22-17:2, 17:19-18:16. Gillmor
specifically pointed out that "[t]he Defendant fails to argue against the laws
conveying the Homestead Patent." R.374. This is critical where a United States
Supreme Court decision from the very era in question has recognized that
Congress had explicitly intended the land office to partition properties between
uses when issuing patents so as to maximize the beneficial exploitation of the
land. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 503, 48 S. Ct. 580, 583, 72
L. Ed. 961, 966 (1928) ("The acts of 1914 and 1920 are to be read together -each as the complement of the other. So read they disclose an intention to
divide oil and gas lands into two estates for the purposes of disposal - one
3

including the underlying oil and gas deposits and the other the surface and to make the latter servient to the former, which naturally would be suggested
by their physical relation and relative values. [Emphasis added.]")
Similarly, Blue Ledge alleges that fee title was passed through a series of
owners ultimately to Blue Ledge. Brief of Appellee, p. 14. However, only ipse
dixit has ever been offered by Blue Ledge to support its claim that its patent
encompassed the entire fee in light of the surface rights plainly conveyed under
the Clark patent.
Blue Ledge asserts that the case of United Park City Mines Company v.
Estate ofClegg, 737 P.2d 173 (Utah 1987) is germane to the instant case on
appeal. Brief of Appellee, p. 14-15. That case has no bearing on the present
action. Neither Nadine F. Gillmor, nor her husband, Frank Gillmor, were parties
to that action, and therefore no claim of ownership of the disputed property was
adjudicated in United Park City Mines Company v. Estate of Clegg.
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT
The district court's grant of summary judgment to Blue Ledge was in error.
The district court failed to acknowledge the strong presumption that the Clark
Patent, ultimately held by Gillmor, is valid in all respects. When a land patent is
granted by the United States, the presumption favors validity. Clear and
convincing evidence is required to overcome that presumption. Once Gillmor
presented a prima facie case showing title by competent evidence, the burden
4
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Clark under a homestead patent. However, Clegg many years ago stood in the
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As a result, the trial court should have found the Blue Ledge suit barred by 43
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Finally, fundamental fairness demands that the dismissal of Gillmor's
adverse possession claim be set aside. Both parties equally delayed prosecution
of their respective claims. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in
dismissing Gillmor's claim but awarded Blue Ledge a final judgment on its
counterclaim.
REPLY ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO BLUE LEDGE.
Blue Ledge argues that it satisfied its burden of proof to quiet title to the
disputed property. Brief of Appellee, p. 17. Blue Ledge states that a party must
prevail on its own strength of claim to title, and not the other parties' weakness.
Citing Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Blue
Ledge states that each party must assume the burden on establishing its title by
competent evidence. Citing Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 76
P.3d 711 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). Finally, Blue Ledge states that if a party can
make a prima facie case showing title, the burden is on the opposing party to
controvert the evidence. Citing Babcock v. Dangerfield, 94 P.2d 862 (Utah 1939).
Blue Ledge's position actually cuts in favor of Gillmor and strongly supports
Gillmor's position that the trial court failed to apply the strong presumption that
the Clark Patent held by Gillmor is valid in all respects. When a land patent is
granted by the United States, the presumption is in favor of validity. United
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States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co. ef a/, I < I U ! > V S
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(1887). To overcome that strong presumption, clear and convincing evidence is
ifM|uiirr1 M inrnphasis added).
[t]o avoid such 'solemn evidences of title emanating from the government
of the United States under its official seal' requires the observance of the
early established rule that it 'cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of
evidence which leaves the issue in doubt' even more than in suits between
private parties for such cancellations. Only 'that class of evidence which
commands respect, and that amount of it which produces conviction shall
make such an attempt successful.'
United States v. Otley, 127 F.2d. 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1942). Blue Ledge's position
lest*- i HI il- perceived weakness in Gillmor's title. However, once Gillmor has
made her prima facie case showing title ". -•• . ompetenl v-\ \<\\ m c m
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Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916). Blue Ridge's evidence simply does not
•

;:.. ,..iisumption »l validity that must be afforded to Gillmor's title that

flows from Clark's homestead patent.
Furthermore, Blue Ledge was required to "show both that there is no
maten.il r.sut i i l i I i i i ,,iat [it as] the movant is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law." On/is v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, U 10,117 P.3d 600, 602. Where
the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant must
establish each element of his claim in order to show that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In order to meet his initial burden on
summary judgment, therefore, [Appellees] must [have] presented]
evidence sufficient to establish that [quieting title in its favor] is appropriate
under the facts of the case, and that no material issues of fact remain. The
burden on summary judgment then shifts to the nonmoving party
[Appellants] to identify contested material facts, or legal flaws in the [claim
that title should be quieted in Appellee].
Id. (citing UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c)(emphasis in original). Herein, there remain
significant, material facts in dispute, facts as to which Blue Ledge offered only
speculation. Why was Johanna A. Clark issued a homestead patent only one (1)
year after Clegg was issued a mining patent? Blue Ledge only has a "hunch" as
to why that happened and speculates that the land office simply "goofed." R. 627
at 2-4. Why did the land office cancel Clark's patent only to the extent of "conflict"
with Clegg's patent upon Clegg's protest of the Clark application and why did
Clegg never challenge the issuance of Clark's homestead patent covering the
surface of the same land? Blue Ledge offers no explanation. Blue Ledge's
speculation and silence does not satisfy the strict requirements of Rule 56©).
Federal patents do not grant rights as of the date of issuance of the patent, but
rather based on the more factually complex determination of the date that an
applicant's "claim of right" came into being. See United States v. Etcheverry, 230
F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1956)(citing cases). Thus, the Clegg patent, although
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issued first in time, might be second in claim nf in|hl
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within the jurisdiction of the land office to adjudicate and it apparently did so,
meaning that the Clegg patent received the residual mineral rights. Blue Ledge
offered no evidence to the contrary.
II CLEGG'S 1930 PATENT DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVEY
SURFACE RIGHTS TO CLEGG.
I'In

I cilji

iliny stveidl cases, claims that a mining patent automatically

includes the surface estate, as well as the mineral estate unless the patent
contains a reservation. The cases relied upon by Blue Ledge, set forth below, do
niN i. in i i , .in

;,,.!. ;

;

r iu™ as asserted by Blue Ledge. None of the

cases dealt with patents issued less than a year from one another, when111 me
patent issued under The Agricultural Entry Act of 1914 and the Stock Raising
I liniii'sledd Ai I ill I Mi. ill ic l i Hi Ail') requiring a reservation to the United
States of the mineral rights.
St Louis Mining & Milling Company of Montana v. Montana Mining Co.,
I 11 11J» A I! 111 )U 11 w.is <i case involving tunneling mines of two different mining
companies. One of the companies discovered an addition

n

the surface of its property downward into the Nine Hour clair,.. ,d. at 236. Given
HIP far I: nl IIIU i.j A., II K HI mil Imiiiil lliatthe mining company could have
pursued a subsurface vein that crossed surface property line;, MI IIHKI as IIu
apex of the vein originated on the surface of the claim. However, the Court did
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not allow an access tunnel to do the same. The case simply predates the
passage of the 1916 Act, and did not involve a grazing patent issued under that
Act with its required reservation of mineral rights.
The case Deffebach v. Haeke, 115 U.S. 392 (1885), likewise predates the
1916 Act and also dealt with a placer mining claim. The Supreme Court therein
indicated "[t]he patent of a placer mining claim carries with it the title to the
surface included within the lines of the mining location, as well as to the land
beneath the surface . . . . " Id. at 406. Because rivers and streams run on the
surface, clearly a placer claim would include surface rights. In contrast, herein
the Clegg patent was not a placer mining claim, and the mandate of Congress to
split surface and mineral rights, followed by a land office adjudication, leaves the
surface rights to Blue Ledge under the mining patent as only those "'required for
all purposes reasonably incident [or necessary] to the mining.'" Belle Fourche
Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 545 (Wyo. 1988).
The facts of both Superior Coal Co. v. Musselshell County, 41 P.2d 14
(Mont. 1935) and Hinz v. Musselshell County, 267 P. 1113 (Mont 1928) were
related to taxation issues. In addition, neither explicates any facts about the
issuance of the patents involved that would suggest that they post-dated passage
of the 1916 Act. Therein, the owners of the properties at issue in the two cases
were trying to avoid taxation of mineral rights on property where the use of the
property had only been surface use. The discussion of the surface rights was
10

relevant only to those taxation issues and not as j n y um-i i jdl ink ul ni|liL
accorded by a mineral patent.
Heiciii Iwl

: ..: ...;....:..::.. Ueggs protest and the Land office

canceled her homestead entry to the extent it "rnnflirtnl
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Nevertheless, the Land office issued the Clark Patent As a result, this Court
inn ,11 inn hull Hi.il Hit I ,iinl ulTii < » dUiun ww.i. h«i »< il on its finding that no
"conflict" existed between the two patents, even llminih llicw cm IHIIIMSMMI IIic
same land. This conclusion would be mandatory if the land office concluded that
-• of the Clark
. aie:u, because the mandatory c^i,
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"Excepting and reserving, howevei, to the United otates all the coal and
other minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with the right
to prospect for, mine, and remove the same pursuant to the provisions and
limitations of the Art of December 29, 1916 (39 Stat., 862)."
Ex A ol "It I to R 358-383 The land office clearly determined to qrant 's«*,|< j | |
ul II u jurface rights in the lam 11 xcept those reasonably necessary to

j

under the mineral right > ri< IHMAMMIM IK IIIIIIII <l III In-, MM nl ilic surtace to those
activities reasonably related to the reserved mineral rights the United St \\\ «
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granted him. Blue Ledge offered no evidence to refute this reasonable
explanation.
Blue Ledge also asserts that the United States did not have title to the
patented claims at the time of the Gillmor Patent. Brief of Appellee, p. 21. In
support, Blue Ledge offers no actual facts governing the claims of right, but rather
cites St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636 (1881). Under St. Louis
Smelting Co. and the other cases cited in support of Blue Ledge's position,
however, it is only where proof is shown that the land office acted outside of its
jurisdiction may a patent be assailed in a court of law:
A patent, in a court of law, is conclusive as to all matter property
determined by the Land Department, when its action is within the
scope of its authority, that is, when it has jurisdiction under the law to
convey the land. In that court the patent is unassailable for mere
errors of judgment.
St. Louis Smelting Co., 104 U.S. at 646. The rule is so strong that even "[i]f in
issuing a patent its officers took mistaken views of the law, or drew erroneous
conclusions from the evidence, or acted from imperfect views of their duty, or
even from corrupt motives, a court of law can afford no remedy to a party alleging
that he is thereby aggrieved." Id. at 647. Blue Ledge failed to produce any
evidence that the land office had no authority to grant Clark a homestead patent
for the disputed property. As set forth above, Blue Ledge cannot prove with clear
and convincing evidence that it was given the surface rights to the property at
issue. Because Blue Ledge has failed to show that the land office lacked
12
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unassailable.
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U U.S.C. § 1166 PROHIBITS BLUE LEDGE FROM CHALLENGING
CLARK'S PATENT.
Blue Ledge's argument that 43 II ° r § 11 cr
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was plainly a successor in owner*u
Blue Ledge's quiet title clain
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Blue Ledge suit was barred by 43 U.S.C. § 1166 because it was filed nearly
seventy years too late.
Even if the Clark patent were void, which it is not, 43 U.S.C. § 1166 makes
it unassailable. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
It is said that the instrument was void and hence was no patent. But
the statute presupposes an instrument that might be declared void.
When it refers to "any patent heretofore issued," it describes the
purport and source of the document, not its legal effect. If the act
were confined to valid patents it would be almost or quite without
use. In form the statute only bars suits to annul the patent. But
statutes of limitation, with regard to land, at least, which cannot
escape from the jurisdiction, generally are held to affect the right,
even if in terms only directed against the remedy. This statute must
be taken to mean that the patent is to be held good and is to have
the same effect against the United States that it would have had if it
had been valid in the first place.
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 450 (1908)
(emphasis added) (ruling that even if patent were void, claim was barred by
statute of limitations). See also Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70, 77 (1908)
(stating that "[i]n United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S.
447, it was decided that this act applied to patents even if void because of a
previous reservation of the land, and it was said that the statute not merely took
away the remedy but validated the patent").
IV.

FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS DEMANDS THAT THE DISMISSAL OF
GILLMOR'S ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM BE SET ASIDE.
This issue is one of fairness. Blue Ledge states that Gillmor failed to

prosecute her adverse possession claim for over thirteen years. Brief of
14

Appellee, p. 30-31. The procedural hist
pursued their various claims until
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Gillmor's adverse possession claim did

the district court until the parties briefed a motion for summary

judgment filed on February 25, 2005 P PR 354) After HIP rrntler w \< hiinleH
.Hid argued, the district court issued a Ruling and Order dated November 8, 2005,
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III ment overture was to filn i

motion to dismiss Gillmor's adverse possession LLIIIII lui I.JIIUH , lu pi

'

Blue Ledge attempts to defend its lack of action by simply dlldikiny
i illmnr " delay

I he Utah Supreme Court has expressed disfavor when a party

blames delays on the other f nil,

I

I i 11 II \\ ulu

in

III il i /.

Department of Social Servs i Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1980) ("fWle
! ..upressed with either fairness or propriety in one party sitting silently by
tor a long period of time, thru ntlr ni| lin | I I il in

II

Hi i | n l " l i Hi ilchy )

Crystal Lime & Cement Co. i Hobbins, 8 Utah 2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624 (1959)
i . lil ii

In .il MI Uluc Ledge's attempt to shift blame exclusively to Gillmor.

Therein, both parties sought to quiet title y<
eight years, when the counterclaimant in that action filed a motion to dismiss.

1«i

Respondents' contentions might be very persuasive if they had not filed
counterclaims in the action asking that title be quieted in them and also
asking that in the event title was not quieted in them that appellant herein
be required to reimburse them the amounts they expended for taxes. In
asking for such affirmative relief they were in effect cross-complainants in
the action . . . . Since any party to this action could have obtained the
relief to which it was entitled at any time it had wanted but both
parties chose to dally for a number of years, it was an abuse of
discretion for the court to grant respondents' motion to dismiss with
prejudice.
335 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added). Justice, therefore, requires that this Court set
aside the dismissal of Gillmor's adverse possession claim and remand it for trial.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Gillmor request that the judgment of the trial court be reversed in its
entirety, and the matter be remanded for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this 25th day of February, 2009.
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